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Abstract 
 
This research paper is the first compresensive effort to get a full overview of public climate 
finance in Belgium. Up to now, reports to international institutions such as UNFCCC have been 
incomplete, because not all funding bodies’ and agencies’ flows were included.  
For the weighting of the climate relevance, two methodologies are used side-by-side: the 0-40-
100 used by most countries and the EU, and the ‘DGD-method’ which is a method sui generis 
developed by the Belgian federal development administration.  
All the partners in the Belgian public climate finance landscape and their activities are first 
explained, and afterwards an overview is provided of the climate flows for the years 2013 and 
2014.  
Except for two public organisations, the figures for all Belgian stakeholders could be retrieved. 
This paper is an important step forward towards full coverage for Belgian public climate finance 
reporting efforts in the near future.  
 
JEL Classification: F35, Q56  
Keywords: climate finance, public climate finance, climate flows, public climate flows, 
development, climate change, climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation 
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1 |  Introduction 
This study was conducted in the context of the Belgian Policy Research Group on Financing for 
Development (BeFind). It is part of the research line on global public goods, which focuses 
primarily on climate finance. 
 
The aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive overview of all official climate-related 
development finance in Belgium in the years 2013-2014. Both the federal and the regional levels 
will be included. We will focus on both Official Development Aid (ODA) and Other Official Flows 
(OOF), knowing that the knowledge about OOF flows is rather sparse because reporting practices 
have been limited to date.  The specific objectives of this paper are to: 
• Provide a short overview of the conceptual discussions that are relevant to calculating Belgian 
climate-related development finance in 2013-2014; 
• Discuss the methodological choices made to measure climate flows, and map the remaining 
gaps in methodology and data; 
• Provide a mapping of Belgian climate finance by looking at the existing data, and by gathering 
additional data through contacting several public actors in Belgium; 
• Make recommendations towards DGD and other actors in Belgium with regard to their future 
reporting practices and the coordination of national reporting efforts. 
 
The report is structured as followed: 
• Chapter 2 discusses the main concepts and discussions relevant for climate finance. This 
includes defining climate finance, and the difference between ODA and OOF 
• Chapter 3 describes the methodological choices we made in accounting for climate finance. 
This includes an explanation of the Rio Markers, and the two weighting methods we used 
in this paper, being the DGD method and the 0-40-100 method. 
• Chapter 4 gives an overview of the most important climate finance actors in Belgium which 
are included in this study. We give a short description, describe the relevance of the actors 
and which data they contributed for this study 
• Chapter 5 presents the results of the study, looking at multilateral and bilateral climate 
finance. We give an overview of bilateral finance per actor, the balance between mitigation-
adaptation and cross-cutting and a regional analysis. 
• Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions of the study 
• Chapter 7 provides recommendations, not only for DGD but also for other Belgian actors 
active in climate finance. 
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2 |  Conceptual discussion 
2.1 What is climate finance? Definitions and international discussions 
 
To date, no single agreed definition on what constitutes climate finance has been used or 
adopted. However, some useful definitions have emerged throughout the last years. The UNFCCC 
Standing Committee on Finance uses the following definition of climate finance: “Climate finance 
aims at reducing emissions, and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing 
vulnerability of, and maintaining and increasing the resilience of, human and ecological systems 
to negative climate change impacts” (UNFCCC 2014, p. 2). This definition has also been used in 
the 2015 OECD report on climate finance, presented at COP-21 in Paris (OECD 2015). However, 
this definition is rather broad, as it also includes climate finance flows within developed countries 
e.g. aiming at low-carbon investments. In our study, the focus is exclusively on the climate finance 
flows from developed countries to or benefiting developing countries, or in onder words: our 
focus is on climate-related development finance.  
 
Within the UNFCCC and beyond, several issues have emerged. First of all, developing countries 
have stressed the need for distinguishing development finance from climate finance, because of 
the historical responsibility for the climate change problems (Pickering et al. 2015). This is 
reflected in the discussion of climate finance and the “new and additional” character of this 
finance, which was first raised at the COP in Copenhagen (2009) and formalised in Cancun (2010). 
The question rose how to operationalize this new and additional character of climate finance: 
should it be new and additional towards the current development aid flows, above the 0.7% of 
GNP allocated to development aid, should it be sourced through different institutions, or are 
there other options to define a baseline (Stadelmann et al. 2011)? To date and according to our 
interviewees, it is very difficult to measure this new and additional character. Moreover, in the 
2015 Paris Agreement, the ‘new and additional’ section disappeared, which can be seen as a step 
backward for the developing countries (Roberts ans Weikmans 2015).  
 
Additionally, the balance between mitigation and adaption finance is a matter of concern. 
Whereas developed countries tend to focus on mitigation finance efforts (as they create a global 
common good), developing countries are stressing the need for adaptation finance, which mainly 
has a local or national effect (Pickering et al. 2015). Currently, 77 per cent of global climate finance 
focusses on mitigation, while only 16 per cent is aimed at adaptation (with 7 per cent cross-cutting 
activities) (OECD 2015). Although there is no common understanding on the ideal balance 
between the two, there is a general reckognition that current adaptation finance is insufficient. 
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Another related issue is the question of transparency and accountability of climate finance 
reporting. The current reporting practices are unclear, differ from country to country and from 
institutions to institution (see Bachus et al. 2015), and cause tension between developing and 
developed countries in the UNFCCC negotiations. An example of this tension is the OECD-CPI 
report from 2015, which tried to assess the progress towards the $ 100 billion goal (OECD 2015). 
Several developing countries, with India as the frontrunner, criticized the report and its 
methodological choices, arguing that the $ 100 billion goal is far from sight (Dasgupta 2015). 
Better and unified reporting practices are expected to contribute to better understanding and 
trust between Annex-I and non-Annex I countries in the UNFCCC negotiation process.  
2.2 ODA vs. OOF 
 
The starting point for calculating climate finance is often the ODA-OOF tracking methodology, 
used in the context of the OECD-DAC, which has a long history in tracking and defining 
development finance.  
 
The difference between ODA and OOF1 is not a difference which has been made in the context of 
climate finance, but originates from development finance practices in the context of the OECD. 
Our previous working papers already looked into this issue, which we will describe shortly in the 
context of this study. 
 
ODA: As already discussed in our previous working papers (Bachus et al. 2015), four elements are 
important with regard to the definition of ODA: 
• Flows: a transfer of resources needs to take place, which can be bilateral or multilateral, 
and are likely to be grants or loans. However, this ‘north-south flow condition’ is regarded 
in a broad sense in our study, as a number of ODA north-north climate flows are considered 
as climate finance. The funding for our study is a good example of such a flow. 
• The objective of economic development and welfare: if the objective is merely commercial, 
it should not count as ODA. 
• Official: the flows are generated by Belgian official actors (being the government). 
• Concessionality: a grant element of at least 25% should be observed. 
 
OOF: Other Official Flows (OOF) are all the other transactions by the official sector that do not 
meet the criteria to be ODA. (taken from OECD 2013 in Bachus et al. 2015): 
• Grants to developing countries for representational or commercial purposes; 
• Transactions aimed at development but with a grant element below 25%; 
• Bilateral transactions with grant elements, but with a primary aim of export facilitation. One 
example is export credits; 
• The net acquisition of securities issued by multilateral development banks at market terms; 
• Subsidies to the private sector to soften its credits to developing countries; 
• Funds in support of private investment; 
• Equities and shares which cannot qualify as ODA; 
 
1 For full definitions of ODA and OOF, we refer to our previous Befind research paper (Bachus et al., 2015) 
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• Reorganisation of non-ODA debt undertaken by the official sector at non-concessional 
terms, and forgiveness of military debt. 
 
OOF is a residual category for all development finance that is not ODA.  Under the current national 
and international reporting schemes, reporting on bilateral OOF is incomplete and sometimes 
inconsistent between countries, which also counts for climate-related OOF (Bachus et al. 2015). 
However, the question can be raised whether the difference between ODA and OOF is truly 
relevant for climate finance. Moreover, although the UNFCCC reporting format requires to make 
the distinction between ODA and OOF, most countries predominantly report ODA contributions, 
while OOF contributions are expected to be only partially covered (OECD 2015). This means that 
information on OOF is often lacking. 
 
Apart from this theoretical distinction between ODA and OOF, several actors in Belgium seem to 
have a different interpretation and use of the two terms. For example, the Walloon region has 
decided to report all of its climate finance as OOF, to underline the “new and additional” character 
of this finance (Interviews 2016). However, this view is not shared by other actors in Belgian 
climate finance sphere. This could potentially lead to inconsistent results, e.g. in the 
characterization of the donations to the Green Climate Fund, where the contribution of the 
federal and Flemish governments is reported as ODA, but the contribution of the Walloon and 
Brussels Capital Region is counted as OOF, although all actors made a grant contribution to the 
fund. In this paper, we will not alter the interpretations of the difference between ODA and OOF, 
and use the categories given by the data providers.   
 
If we look at the difference between ODA and OOF as the starting point of this study, it is 
interesting to compare the Belgian reporting practices with other countries. However, with regard 
to global bilateral climate finance, ODA remains the predominant source, currently accounting 
for 84% of global climate finance in 2013-2014 (OECD 2015). If we compare the entries of the 
Belgian second UNFCCC biennial reporting with other countries, it stands out that most other 
countries are mainly reporting ODA commitments, rather than other sources (OECD 2015). 
However, this seemingly coherent way of spending could change in the future, especially with 
regard to the possible set-up of national green investment banks or the roll-out of green bonds. 
The following table gives an overview of which countries report on both ODA and OOF practices, 
or only on OOF in the second Biennial reports of 2015:  
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Figure 1.  Reporting coverage and approaches for public bilateral climate finance (2013-14) (OECD 
2015, p. 45) 
 
If we compare the biennial reports of Belgium with neighbouring countries and with Scandinavia, 
we see that, apart from Belgium, only France and Luxembourg report climate-related OOF 
seperately, while all other countries only include ODA sources. Given the fact that ODA is still the 
overwhelming source of climate finance, this is not surprising. This results limits expectations for 
the amount of OOF climate flows we will find in our study. The fact that Belgium reports on OOF 
could be attributed to the different interpretation of the concept of OOF by several actors in 
Belgium, which we will discuss later on.  
13 
 
 Public Climate finance in Belgium 
 
3 |  Methodological choices 
3.1 Climate finance definition by the Rio Marker method  
 
As stated before, climate finance has not yet been defined clearly in an international context. This 
is why we will not follow a strict definition, but we decide to follow the OECD-DAC Rio Marker 
method (OECD 2011), which has been thoroughly explained in our 2015 paper (Bachus et al. 
2015). The OECD-DAC has developed four markers: mitigation, adaptation, desertification and 
biodiversity. Only the mitigation and adaptation markers are the subject of this paper. The current 
system works as follows. A financial flow of a project can be marked 0, 1 or 2. If mitigation or 
adaptation is not an objective of the project, the score will be 0. If the mitigation or adaptation is 
the principal objective of the project, it will be scored 2. If the mitigation or adaptation is not the 
principal aim of the project but still significant, it will be scored 1. This method is also used by 
most of the Annex I-countries for their Biennial reports (OECD 2015). However, the Rio Markers 
system has not been developed with the purpose of quantification in mind: it is rather set up to 
make a qualitative “flagging” on whether an (ODA) project could be marked as climate-relevant 
or not (Bachus et al. 2015).  
 
Figure 2.  The scoring system for climate markers (OECD 2011, p. 5) 
 
Although the Rio Marker method was never intended for the quantification of finance flows, most 
countries are now using it for their climate finance reporting, as the system is rather 
straightforward and has the advantage of clarity.  
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However, the use of the Rio Markers has one major discussion point, which is related to the 
weighting of the flows in order to get an aggregated estimate for the total climate flows. For the 
activities marked ‘0’ or ‘2’, the weighting issue generates no discussion: 
 
• If an activity is marked ‘2’ (principal), climate finance are accounted at 100%
2
, and 
the whole sum is taken into account for calculating total climate flows. 
• If the activity has a marker ‘0’ (not an objective), logically 0% of the flow is labelled 
as climate finance.  
 
However, for the activities marked ‘1’ (climate is not the principle, but still a significant objective), 
several options are available with regard to the weighting. Although several countries use 
different practices and weighting methods with regard to the treatment of the ‘1’ markers (see 
OECD 2015 p. 48-49 for an overview of these different weighting methods), two main options are 
used within the Belgian context: 
 
Method 1: 0-40-100: The European Commission and the Flemish actors have decided to use the 
following weighting method: 
• 0 % if the activity scores 0 on both the mitigation and adaptation marker 
• 40 % if the activity scores 1 on one of the markers 
• 100% if the activity scores 2 on one of the markers 
 
If a project marks on “1” for both mitigation and adaptation, only 40% in total is counted as 
climate finance (20% mitigation and 20% adaptation). Flanders does this by categorizing the 
activity as cross-cutting (both mitigation and adaptation), rather than marking it both on 
mitigation and adaptation.  
 
Method 2: DGD method: The Federal Development Cooperation administration (DGD) has 
developed its own weighting method based on sector codes which are attributed to each project. 
In total, there are 101 categories. The DGD weighting factors per sector can be found in Annex 1 
(in Dutch). The rationale between this weighting method ‘sui generis’ is the possible 
overvaluation (double counting) of the 40% which is attributed to the “1” marker in the Flemish 
and EU systems (Interviews). This weighting method has been developed for all Rio Markers 
(including desertification and biodiversity), in order to avoid double counting (Interviews). If a 
project scores 1 on mitigation or adaptation, the sector code will define the percentage of the 
budget that can be allocated as climate finance (ibid). In practice, the total percentage allocated 
to the total of the two climate-related Rio markers rarely exceeds 40% of the flow. As a result, 
the DGD method mostly leads to significantly lower total climate flows than method 1. The 
decision tree used for the DGD method is as follows: 
 
2  Although a small number of countries sometimes give a smaller number than 100% in some cases. 
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Figure 3.  DGD method for weighting based on the Rio Markers 
(M = mitigation, A = adaptation, B = biodiversity, D = desertification) 
 
The DGD method does not only take into account the mitigation and adaptation markers, but also 
the biodiversity and desertification markers. The sum of the four markers can never exceed 100%. 
This means that, even with a marker 2 for ‘mitigation’, the weight can be less than 100%, if there 
is a positive marker for biodiversity or desertification. For example, a project with markers 2-0-2-
0 will get a 50% climate finance weight in the DGD method but a 100% climate finance weight in 
the 0-40-100 method. The example shows that the two methods can result in different weights 
in case of a marker ‘1’ or ‘2’.  
 
In our study, we will make use of both weighting methods, so we can compare the two systems 
and provide further input in streamlining climate finance data for Belgium in future Biennial and 
MMR reporting. For flows that have already been reported in the past, we will take over the 
reported weighting factor and cross-match it for the other weighting method.3 For the new flows 
that do not have a Rio marker yet, we will grant the Rio marker and the weighting factors 
ourselves. Due to limited data availability, the basis of our assessment will mostly be limited to 
the title of the project, sometimes supplemented by a quick internet search for more information 
on the project.  
 
3  A reflection we want to make is that the government climate experts that grant the Rio Markers ‘0’, ‘1’ and ‘2’ to 
the specific projects and flows may already (implicitly) take into account the weighting method that will be used 
afterwards. If the user realises that the DGD method leaves the option to grant a low weight to a project with 
marker ‘1’, that person may be inclined to give a marker ‘1’ to a project that (intuitively) only has a low climate 
relevance. By contrast, the person using the 0-40-100 method may give the same project a marker ‘0’ as he or she 
feels a 40% weight would be an overvaluation of the climate relevance of that particular project. In this study we 
cannot know if that ‘bias’ exists and if it is important, as we just take over the marker that was granted by the 
policy expert, and then apply the ‘other’ weighting method to it.  
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3.2 Instrument selection and grant equivalent 
 
The instruments through which climate finance can flow are manifold, and are expected to vary 
even more in the future. However, for the sake of clarity, and also because the number of 
instruments used in Belgian (and most other countries’) climate finance is rather limited, we will 
focus on the four following instruments: 
- Grants: “transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment is required” 
(OECD Glossary 2016) 
- Loans: transfers for which repayment is required. Within the category of loans, two main 
options are available: 
o Concessional: loans that are provided at softer terms than market terms. For 
ODA, a minimum grant element of 25% needs to be present in order for the loan 
to be counted as concessional (OECD 2015) 
o Non-concessional: loans provided at (near)-market terms. 
- Equity investment: “an investment in ownership interest of stockholders in a firm, usually 
in the form of stock (not bonds)” (OECD 2014, p. 421).    
- Guarantees: “a risk-sharing agreement under which the guarantor agrees to pay part or 
the entire amount due on a loan, equity or other instrument to the lender/investor in the 
event of non-payment by the borrower or loss of value in case of investment” (OECD, 
2015, p. 58). 
 
Another important methodological element is the distinction between the face value (e.g. the 
“net value of an instrument) and the grant equivalent of the instrument. Multiple methods are 
available to calculate the grant equivalent, and all require different information. Below, we will 
discuss the use of the grant equivalent for grants, loans, equity and guarantees. 
 
Grant equivalent for grants 
 
If we look at grants, no complexities arise: grants are counted at 100%, and there is obviously no 
need to calculate the grant equivalent of a grant. 
 
Grant equivalent for loans 
 
With regard to loans, two main options are available (Cassimon 2014): 
• Face value counting of loans, with or without the inclusion of negative flows when the loan 
and the interests are repaid. 
• The calculation of a grant element and a grant equivalent, which can be done by several 
methods. 
 
Both options have their merits and weaknesses: the first option makes the data analysis easier, 
and it could be done when not enough information about the conditions of the loan is available. 
It has also been used in another study on Belgian Climate Finance (Trinomics 2015). However, as 
loans are often disbursed once (where the full amount is given), the repayment period can be 
rather long, especially if long grace periods are applied (Interviews). This option could therefore 
17 
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significantly overestimate the current climate finance streams, whilst creating a negative picture 
on the longer term (when all the loans are repaid). This is why we prefer the use of the grant 
equivalent, which is the most valid method. 
 
With regard to concessional loans, the calculation of the grant equivalent is relatively easy, as 
such a loan needs to have a grant element of minimum 25% before it can be considered as ODA. 
In case of ODA eligibility, the grant equivalent is usually calculated when the loan is provided, thus 
easily available. Where possible, depending on data availability, we will take into account the 
grant element in this study.  
 
In order to calculate the grant equivalent, one has to start by calculating the concessionality of 
the loan, which is expressed as “the percentage by which the present value of the expected 
stream of repayment falls short of the repayments that would have been generated at a given 
reference rate of interests” (OECD 2014, p.422). The current discount rate used by the OECD is 
10%, which means that the grant element is 0 for a loan with an interest rate of 10% and above 
and 100% for a grant. A concessional loan currently lies in between these two numbers. The grant 
equivalent is then the multiplication of the face value of the loan by the grant element.  
 
Cassimon et al. (2015) have formulated the methodology as followed:  
 
 
 
 
Where L stands for the nominal Loan, NPV for Net Present Value of the loan and PV for the Present 
Value of the reflows to the donor (Cassimon et al. 2015). 
 
This means that: 
 
 
 
In calculating the grant element, we will use the excel calculator made available by the OECD-DAC 
on their website. However, this means that other information is needed, such as the face value 
of the loan, the type of repayment, the interest rate, the maturity, the grace period, and the 
agreed discount rate etc. This means that a lot of information is needed to calculate the grant 
equivalent. An example: a concessional loan of € 1 million to a developing country, with fixed 
monthly repayments, a (beneficial) interest rate of 2%, a maturity of 15 years, a grace period of 
3 years, and a discount rate of 5%, would have a grant element of 20,9% or € 209.000. 
 
If data availability makes it impossible to use the grant equivalent, we will have to report the loan 
at face value, report on the grant contributions (sometimes the case in the context of a 
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concessional loan) which have been made in the context of the loan, or just report on the data 
received. However, we do want to stress our preference for the use of the grant equivalent. The 
grant equivalent has the benefit of clarity and validity, as it better describes the real donor effort 
calculated for the reporting moment. It also measures the donor effort by making sure that the 
net ODA of a loan is not counted as 0 (as is the case with face value methods) (Cassimon et al. 
2015). 
 
Grant equivalent of equity 
 
If we look at equity, the calculation of a grant equivalent is not easy. Again, the OECD has made 
recommendations about possible ways in developing a grant equivalent method (OECD 2015c). 
As for now, we will not focus on the development of a methodology on equity instruments, as 
this would be too far-fetched for this study. However, if necessary internationally agreed 
measures of calculating the grant equivalent are developed, we encourage their use. 
 
Grant equivalent for guarantees 
 
With regard to guarantees, the calculation of the grant equivalent is even more challenging, as in 
most cases the guarantee does not give rise to any actual flow. Additionally, there is no agreed 
method for calculating the grant equivalent of guarantees, although the OECD has made some 
progress in trying to calculate the guarantee grant equivalent by proposing a method that 
considers the annual premium asked by the guarantor as the “interest rate” for the guarantee, 
and by constructing different discount rates based on the discount rate for loans (OECD 2015c). 
 
However, as no agreed methodology is available, at this moment, several options are possible: 
• Reporting on the guarantees that have actually been paid out. 
• Reporting on the guaranteed amount or the premium paid 
• Calculating a grant equivalent based on a chosen methodology 
 
All in all, our reporting depends on data availability whether face value or grant equivalent 
methods are used. However, for the sake of validity and international comparability, we strongly 
encourage the use of the grant equivalent for any instrument when reporting on public climate 
finance. As we expect the overall majority of climate finance in Belgium to originate from grants 
or concessional loans (for which the grant element is counted, and which are included in the ODA-
database), we do not expect a large impact of the calculation of the grant equivalents in our 
reporting.  
3.3 Other methodological choices 
 
In order to calculate the flows of public climate finance to developing countries, it is also 
necessary to limit and define the recipient countries. We will use the list of ODA-recipients, 
because of significant overlap between this list and the non-Annex I countries of the UNFCCC, and 
the current tracking methodology for ODA which is based on the OECD-DAC list. The list can be 
consulted in Annex 2. 
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The question whether an actor can count as a public or a private actor is also important for our 
study, and to define which flows are included. We define a funder as public if it is owned by public 
actors for more than 50%. 
 
The next question concerns the point of measurement, which is the question in which phase a 
certain flow is reported: the first option is to when the flow is ‘pledged’, e.g. announced by a 
minister during a speech or mentioned in a policy brief. A second option is to take the moment 
of ‘commitment’, which means that there is “a firm written obligation by a government, backed 
availability of the necessary funds, to provide a specified amount for specified purposes for the 
benefit of a recipient country or multilateral agency” (OECD, 2015, p.58). As one can see, this goes 
further than a pledge, where the mere promise of a certain amount is made, e.g. as described on 
the following UNFCCC-portal. Yet, a commitment does not necessarily mean that the instrument 
or financial flow is immediately paid. The next step and option is the moment of disbursement, 
which refers to “the release of funds to or the purchase of goods and services for a recipient, by 
extension, the amount thus spent” (OECD, 2015, p.58). In this paper, we follow the international 
trend to choose the disbursement level, but we are dependent on the level of detail received by 
the Belgian public actors, as not all data will be available on the disbursement level. For all data 
that is not on the level of disbursement, we will explicitly mention this in our section 5 ‘Results’ 
and pay attention to avoiding any double counting.  
 
 
  
20 
 
Lize Van Dyck en Kris Bachus 
4 |  Description of the most relevant actors for 
climate finance in Belgium  
In this chapter, we give a short overview of the most important actors for climate finance in 
Belgium. We will give a short bio for each of the actors, and indicate whether they contributed 
data for our study. In the future, the list of actors may change if other actors become active in the 
public climate finance sphere. However, we do expect the actors from our study to remain 
important in the future. 
 
The political context and reporting practices related to climate finance differs between the 
federal government, the regions and the communities. In December 2015, the climate ministers 
of the different Belgian governments agreed on their so-called “burden-sharing”, which included 
climate finance agreements for the period 2015-2020. The overall commitment from Belgium 
towards international public climate finance is set at minimum € 50 million per year. From 2015 
until a revision in 2017, each level will be responsible for the following share of this total amount 
(NKC 2015): 
• Federal level: € 25 million 
• Flemish region: € 14.5 million 
• Walloon region: € 8.25 million 
• Brussels Capital Region: € 2.25 million. 
In line with these commitments, we expect public climate finance funding originating from the 
regions will need to increase in future years, as the results show they do not meet the above 
numbers yet.  
4.1 Federal level 
4.1.1 DGD 
 
DGD, or the Directorate General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, is part of 
the Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation 
since 2002. The principle objective of DGD is to strive for sustainable human development and to 
ban poverty, exclusion and inequality for the people living in developing countries.4  
Within DGD, a separate department for Climate, Environment and Natural Resources is 
responsible for climate-related issues within the department (D2.4). DGD is responsible for the 
coordination of the Belgian climate finance reporting process, as the majority of funds originate 
from their budget lines, including the contributions made to the Green Climate Fund. 
 
4  Article 3 of the Law of 12 April 2013 on Development Cooperation  
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Relevance: DGD currently provides the large majority of the Belgian climate finance, and 
coordinates climate finance reporting for Belgium. We expect them to remain a crucial actor for 
climate finance in the future. 
 
Data: DGD has, as the commissioner of this study, provided the full details of the ODA and OOF-
database for 2013 and 2014, together with the reporting tables that were used for the UNFCCC 
Biennal reporting. We also conducted an interview with three experts of the Directorate General.  
4.1.2 Federal Public Service of Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment (FPS 
Environment) 
 
The Federal Public Service of Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment (FPS Environment), and 
its Climate Change team, is the responsible environment administration on the federal level. It 
coordinates international climate change negotiations for Belgium, as well as environmental and 
climate policy and the EU ETS. The FPS is also active in knowledge gathering on climate finance 
activities in Belgium, e.g. by ordering a study on promoting private sector actions in the fight 
against climate change in Belgium and abroad (Trinomics 2016).  
 
Relevance: FPS Environment is especially relevant for its role in coordinating and monitoring 
intra-Belgian climate action, and on the international climate negotiations. Their current own 
climate finance budgets are limited, but they remain an important coordinating actor. 
 
Data: The FPS has provided data on their climate projects in developing countries, but they were 
already known and included in current databases. Their own climate finance budgets are quite 
low. We conducted an interview with the two main experts in climate finance of the FPS. 
4.1.3 BIO 
 
The Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries (BIO) has been established in 2001 by 
the Belgian Development Coordination minister. BIO is a private company, but its capital is held 
by the Belgian state, hereby giving it autonomy and flexibility in organizing its activities. The 
mission of BIO is to “support a strong private sector in developing and/or emerging countries, to 
enable them to gain access to growth and sustainable development within the framework of the 
Sustainable Development Goals” (BIO 2016a), thereby clearly having a development goal. BIO 
uses a range of instruments, such as (BIO 2016b): 
- Equity or quasi-equity stakes: BIO always takes minority stakes, until a company has a 
maturity level which is high enough. This corresponds with the approach of the Belgian 
Corporation for International Investment (BMI-SBI, see 4.1.7) 
- Long-term loans: terms vary between 3 and 10 years, with a maximum grace period of 10 
years 
- Guarantees: BIO provides a guarantee of solvability to private sector actors 
- Local currency: BIO can reduce the exchange rate risks for its clients 
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BIO also adheres to environmental and social responsibility standards, and takes them into 
account in the allocation of its budgets (Bio 2016). 
 
Relevance: In the future, we expect BIO will become an important actor to contribute to the 
Belgian climate finance reporting, because it has an explicit development focus and a clear focus 
on renewable energy projects. We advise to approach them in order to clarify their role in future 
climate finance activities and reporting. 
 
Data: BIO has provided partial data, mainly on an aggregated level. However, due to time 
constraints and the current lack of a quick method to extract the climate finance data from their 
project database, BIO’s flows are not included in our main database. However, BIO is prepared to 
collaborate in future climate finance reporting efforts. 
4.1.4 Finexpo 
 
Finexpo is an interministerial advisory committee, managed by Belgian Foreign Affairs and the 
Finance ministry, that supports companies who want to export goods and services abroad. It 
responds to requests by companies and banks who are seeking export credit aid (Finexpo 
website). The flows from Finexpo do not directly go to the South, but to Belgian companies. 
However, the support of Finexpo makes the project financing 35 % cheaper for projects in 
developing countries. Finexpo does not have a specific climate objective: its main aim is to 
support Belgian export (Interviews). 
 
Finexpo uses the following instruments (Interviews): 
- Interest stabilizations: the interest rates companies pay are fixed, the fluctuations are 
covered by Finexpo. This instrument has not been used (yet) in the context of climate 
finance. The instrument is commercial (non-concessional) and not included in ODA 
statistics. Currently, the use of the instrument is limited because of the lows interest rates 
worldwide. 
- Interest bonifications: The interests of the loan given to a Belgian company by a Belgian 
bank, are paid by Finexpo. However, to adhere to the 35% grant element because of ODA-
regulations, an extra grant is needed to cover this percentage. 
- State-to-state loans: Two types of State-to-state loans exist: 
- Tied loans: These loans cannot be given to LDC’s or Heavily Indebted Pour Countries 
(Trinomics 2016). Tied loans are comprised of 
o a state loan of 2/3 of the budget, with a 15-year grace period and a 40-year 
duration  
o 1/3 commercial credit on the short term 
- Untied loans: loans without the commercial credit, applicable to LDC’s and HIPC’s. 
- Grants:  usually in combination with other instruments, rarely used alone. 
 
The calculation of the grant equivalent for the activities of Finexpo seems straightforward, as they 
are obliged the use the 35% threshold for a grant element in their activities. However, in order to 
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calculate the grant equivalent of the Finexpo loans, we will need detailed data on the modalities 
of the loans.  
 
Relevance: We see Finexpo as an important actor to contribute to the Belgian climate finance 
reporting, as their climate flows are already important today. We advise to approach them in 
order to clarify their role in future climate finance activities and reporting. 
 
Data: Through the Ministry of Finance, we have received a selection of projects that qualify as 
climate finance. All activities from Finexpo count as ODA, and they are already included in the 
DGD database. However, for reasons of confidentiality, the data are only provided on an 
aggregated level. This is why we will exclude the bonifications from the DGD database, and 
include the data from Finexpo separately. The only missing data for Finexpo was the detailed 
modalities of the loans (type of repayment, interest rate, maturity, grace period, agreed 
discount rate etc.). For that reason, we will not be able to calculate the grant equivalent of the 
loans.  
 
4.1.5 Delcredere 
 
Delcredere is the Belgian public credit insurer, working as an autonomous government institution 
with state guarantees (Delcredere 2016). The goal of Delcredere is to ensure (mostly Belgian) 
companies against political and commercial risks concerning their international commercial 
transactions, mainly by insuring the risk of a client of a Belgian company defaulting on its 
payments (ibid).  Delcredere operates several instruments for its approach (Interviews): 
• Insurance instruments: insuring the exporter against political and commercial risks 
• Guarantees: guarantee for the loan of a bank to a private company 
• Direct financing: a small, and therefore less relevant, instrument. 
 
There is significant complementarity with the activities of Finexpo, as all the operations of Finexpo 
need to be covered by an insurance of Delcredere (Interviews).  
 
Delcredere has no ODA or other development objective, as its sole aim is to support the activities 
and export of Belgian companies. However, this does not mean that they do not support climate-
relevant projects. Delcredere is active in the OECD Arrangement on Export Credits, which is a 
gentlemen’s agreement among several other Export Credit Agencies (ECA’s). Within this 
Arrangement, ECA’s aim at providing a level playing field and eliminating subsidies and trade 
distortions (OECD 2016). Within this framework, several export credits sector understandings 
have been negotiated, including on climate change mitigation and adaptation, renewable energy 
and water projects. If projects adhere to these categories, the standards of ECA’s can be more 
flexible. Additionally, the sector understanding on coal-fired electricity generation projects (CFSU) 
forbids ECA’s in participating in dirty-coal activities (Interviews).  
 
Relevance: We see Delcredere as a potentially important actor to contribute to the Belgian 
climate finance reporting, because of the complementarity with the Finexpo loans, for which 
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Delcredere issues guarantees. We advise to approach them in order to clarify their role in future 
climate finance activities and reporting. 
 
Data: We conducted an interview with Delcredere, and they were prepared to collaborate with 
the study. However, due to time constraints and approval procedures, the end of our study came 
to soon to include Delcredere’s data. They have shown willingness to cooperate to further climate 
finance efforts in the future. 
4.1.6 National Lottery  
 
The National Lottery (National Lottery) is the official state lottery in Belgium, and has the 
monopoly on public lottery in Belgium (Nationale Loterij 2014).  It is owned by the Belgian state 
by 79%, with the Federal Participation and Investment Company holding the remaining shares. 
Apart from maintaining ethical standards when organizing lottery activities, the National Lottery 
has to adhere to CSR-practices in their own subsidy activities as well (Nationale Loterij 2014). 
 
In return for its monopoly, the National Lottery needs to pay an annual “monopoly rent” of 
135 million euros to the Belgian State. Additionally, the National Lottery is required to provide 
subsidies to DGD for the following amounts: 
• 2013: € 66.241.500,00  
• 2014: € 62.929.425,00 
These flows are intra-Belgian flows and all DGD expenditures are already accounted for in our 
data. Therefore, adding them to our total would lead to double counting. However, the National 
Lottery is a relevant actor for another reason as well: they launch project calls that grant subsidies 
to projects, and some of those flows can be labelled as climate finance.  
 
Relevance: Because of their subsidy calls, we see the National Lottery as an important actor for 
the Belgian public climate finance reporting. We advise to approach them in order to clarify their 
role in future climate finance activities and reporting. 
 
Data: The National Lottery has provided information on their activities by sending a list of the 
projects funded in their calls on the Millennium Goals, which were launched yearly between 2006 
and 2015. The funds are grants granted to non-profit organizations. Based on this information 
and the Rio-Marker manual, we have selected and marked the climate-relevant projects. 
However, the data is given on commitment level, as disbursement level data was not available. 
The organisation that gets the grant has a two-year period in which they can show the paperwork 
before actual disbursement takes place.  
Our study is the first Belgian climate finance reporting effort ever to contain flows from the 
National Lottery. 
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4.1.7 Belgian Corporation for International Investment (BMI-SBI)  
 
Short Description: BMI-SBI is a Belgian investment company that supports the Belgian private 
sector in setting-up local entities abroad by taking minority participations in their operations. 
(BMI-SBI 2016). Its primary stakeholders (for 63%) are Belgian public institutions
5
, while the 
remaining stocks are in private hands, thereby making it a public company.  The equity of BMI-
SBI totals 35 million euros, and it has so far supported more than 300 projects worldwide (BMI-
SBI 2016). Although their primary mission is to support Belgian companies, BMI-SBI could be 
active in climate finance activities, especially since it is involved in the EFDI (European 
Development Finance Institutions).  
 
Figure 4. BMI-SDI’s investment stages  
Source: BMI-SBI (2016) 
 
Figure 4 shows that BMI-SBI plays a role in the whole investment project cycle. It advises on the 
feasibility and the risks of the projects. After the decision to invest, BMI-SBI stays on board as 
an adviser and to monitor the economic activity. When the project is mature BMI-SBI will end 
its participation at terms that were clearly defined from the outset. 
 
Relevance: We see the Belgian Corporation for International Investment (BMI-SBI) as a 
potentially important actor to contribute to Belgian climate finance reporting. We advise to 
approach them in order to clarify their role in future climate finance activities and reporting. 
 
Data: BMI-SBI reported to us that they have not provided any climate relevant flows for the 
period 2013-2014, although this could change in the future. Therefore, we advise to consult BMI-
SBI for the next reporting period.  
 
5 Federal Holding and Investment Company and the National Bank of Belgium.   
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4.2   Flemish Region 
4.2.1 Internationaal Vlaanderen (IV) 
 
Internationaal Vlaanderen is the administration responsible for the international policy of the 
Flemish Government. Apart from the international representation, the department is also 
responsible for development cooperation and related data gathering and reporting. The Flemish 
development policy mainly focuses on the Southern African region. Internationaal Vlaanderen 
has also developed the Flemish database on climate finance, which was published on their 
website recently. In order to have a comprehensive database, IV coordinates the reporting for all 
the Flemish government departments. 
 
Relevance: Internationaal Vlaanderen is already an important actor to contribute to the Belgian 
climate finance reporting, and this importance may increase further in the near future, as the 
contributions of the three regions to Belgian climate finance is expected to rise in the future.  
 
Data: Internationaal Vlaanderen provided full data to us, and also published their whole database 
on climate finance on their website during our study. 
4.2.2 LNE 
 
The Environment, Nature and Energy administration of the Flemish Government (LNE) is the key 
environment administration in Flanders, and is responsible for planning and evaluating 
environmental policy in Flanders (LNE 2016). They also involved in the international climate 
finance negotiations on the EU and the UNFCCC level. Furthermore, LNE coordinates the Flemish 
Partnership Water for Development, which has been running since 2004. The idea was to improve 
water and sanitation in the south by bundling knowledge and expertise and by pooling financial 
resources, from different public and private partners, including companies and NGOs (VPWVO 
2016). LNE has recently made contributions to the Green Climate Fund for the Flemish Region. 
And finally, LNE coordinates the Flemish Fund for Tropical Forests, that also contains climate 
flows.  
 
Relevance: the international department of LNE is very active in the international discussions on 
the MRV of climate finance. Moreover, it is a significant provider of climate finance through its 
current project work and the Partnership Water for Development.  
 
Data: The climate finance flows originating from LNE are included in the Flemish database on 
climate finance. We also received additional data on co-financing from other public Belgian actors 
in the context of the Partnership Water for Development. We conducted an additional interview 
with them.  
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4.2.3 FIT 
 
Flanders Investment and Trade (FIT) supports Flemish companies who want to export or 
internationalize their business, and aims to attract foreign investment in Flanders. In general, they 
aim to: 
- Advise and provide guidance to companies on investing in Flanders 
- Bring buyers into contact with Flemish producers 
- Help Flemish companies with their export plans (FIT 2016). 
 
In doing so, three main subsidy lines are important: 
- Subsidies for feasibility studies: FIT co-finances 50% of feasibility studies by Flemish 
companies for economic activities abroad 
- Subsidies for export of equipment 
- Subsidies for international activities: mainly budgeting for international congresses, 
translation work and prospection work. 
 
Relevance: Although FIT does not have any development goals, their support mechanisms are 
expected to include a number of relevant development-related climate flows. 
 
FIT is not expected to be a main climate finance provider, but could still be a source of climate 
finance through its funding mechanisms. 
 
Data: We received data from Flanders Investment and Trade on their activities, which are 
included in this study. They concern subsidies for feasibility studies and subsidies for export of 
equipment. The researchers carried out the selection of the relevant flows in the list themselves, 
and we also gave Rio Markers to the flows.  
Our study is the first Belgian climate finance reporting effort ever to contain flows from 
Flanders Investment and Trade. 
4.2.4 PMV 
 
Participatiemaatschappij Vlaanderen (PMV) is the Flemish investment company of the Flemish 
government. One of its goals is to invest in the sustainable development of Flanders (PMV 2016). 
It finances public-private partnerships, supports start-ups and large infrastructure projects . 
 
Relevance: PMV has been active in emissions trading activities, and it’s looking to position itself 
in the climate finance debate in the future. Therefore, it is advisable to consult them for future 
climate finance tracking efforts. 
 
Data: We received information on their activities, but we assessed the PMV flows as not relevant 
for climate finance; they are aimed at acquiring certified emission reductions (CER’s) in the 
context of the CDM mechanism. However, they could be an important actor in the future. 
28 
 
Lize Van Dyck en Kris Bachus 
4.2.5 FWO 
 
The Fund for Scientific Research (FWO) is the main science funder in Flanders. It has two main 
objectives: supporting fundamental and strategic scientific research by providing PhD-grants and 
funding for senior researchers such as professors, and supporting international scientific 
collaboration (FWO 2016).  
 
Relevance: FWO could be relevant in providing climate finance through its international activities, 
as some of the studies it funds are both development- and climate-related.  
 
Data: FWO has provided data on possible climate finance flows, based on keywords and relevant 
disciplines we provided. These are included in the study. 
Our study is the first Belgian climate finance reporting effort ever to contain flows from the 
Flemish Fund for Scientific Research. 
  
4.3   Walloon Region 
4.3.1 AWAC 
 
The Agence Wallonne de l’Air et du Climat (AWAC) was created in 2008 as a separate agency from 
the Walloon environment administration. Its goal is to manage climate, air and ozone policies for 
the Walloon region (AWAC 2016).  It is also responsible for the international climate finance 
commitments of the Walloon region (Interviews). Furthermore, it was responsible for the 
management of the fast-start finance from the Walloon region in the periode 2010-2012, and has 
conducted and implemented several project calls in doing so (ibid). 
 
Relevance: as the main Walloon climate finance provider and responsible administration, AWAC 
is the main contact point with regard to climate finance in the Walloon Region. Therefore, we 
advise to consult with them on further climate finance tracking efforts. 
 
Data: We conducted an interview with the person responsible for climate finance. We also 
received detailed data from AWAC, and included them in our reporting in section 5 of this paper. 
Some of the data from the Walloon region reported in our study were not reported in any 
Belgian climate finance reporting efforts in the past.  
4.3.2 AWEX 
 
The Agence wallonne à l'Exportation et aux Investissements Etrangers (AWEX) is an agency of the 
Walloon region and responsible for the promotion of foreign trade and the attraction of foreign 
investors to the Walloon Region. It has a worldwide range, and has several offices in countries 
abroad (AWEX 2016). In covering its activities, it makes use of a wide array of instruments, such 
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as providing information, financial support for study trips or studies, and some international 
financial instruments. 
 
Relevance: As for its Flemish counterpart, AWEX could possibly fund climate relevant activities 
through its instruments. Therefore, we advise to consult them for the following years. 
 
Data: For this study, no data from AWEX were obtained due to time constraints. 
4.3.3 Wallonie-Bruxelles International 
 
Wallonie-Bruxelles International (WBI) is the agency in charge of the international relations of the 
Walloon-Brussels regions. It is manged both by the Walloon region, the Wallonie-Bruxelles 
federation and the French speaking commission of the Brussels capital region. The agency has 
several representations abroad. It promotes the international activities of the Walloon and 
Brussels Capital Regions, and is responsible for their development cooperation (WBI 2016). 
 
Relevance: as the main organisation responsible for development cooperation policies from the 
French speaking region, WBI is a relevant climate finance provider. 
 
Data: Wallonie-Bruxelles International delivered detailed data to the researchers, which are 
included in our reporting. It is the first time this organisation reports its climate finance in such a 
detailed way.  
4.4   Brussels Capital Region 
4.4.1 Brussels International 
 
Brussels International is responsible for the foreign policy of the Brussels Capital region. In doing 
so, it connects with other cities and regions in the world, is active in international network, 
represents the Brussels region in international negotiations and is responsible for advice on 
weapons export of the region (Brussels International 2016). 
 
Relevance: through its activities, Brussels International could be a climate finance provider, 
although we do not expect them to have large contributions. 
 
Data: Brussels International has (through Brussels Environment) provided data on their activities. 
However, no relevant climate finance flows were reported for the period 2013-2014. 
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4.4.2 Brussels Environment  
 
Brussels Environment (BIM) is the agency responsible for environmental policies of the Brussels 
Capital Region. It has several competencies, including the transposition of EU legislation in to 
Brussels policy, collection information on environment indicators, respond to possible hazards 
etc. (BIM 2016). 
 
Relevance: although we do not expect Brussels Environment to be a major climate finance 
provider, their competences on environmental policy make them a relevant partner.  
 
Data: Brussels Environment has provided data on their activities. Apart from the multilateral 
finance which was already included in the biennial reporting, no new climate relevant flows were 
reported for the period 2013-2014. 
4.5 Summary of data availability per actor 
 
In the table below we summarize the data coverage of our study for all the Belgian actors. We 
also add a column indicating if this actor should play a role in a futre Belgian coordinated climate 
change reporting effort. The actors in green have not been in any Belgian climate finance efforts 
before this study. For the actors in orange, the data we cover are more detailed than reported 
earlier for these actors. Red means no or very incomplete data were available. The other were 
either already known and reported flows, or for some actors it means that they were solicited 
for the first time, but reported that none of their outgoing flows are relevant. For the latter 
group, relevant flows may show up in the future, and it is still advisable to involve them in 
reporting initiatives. 
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Table 1.  Data coverage per actor 
Actor Data coverage Relevant flows 
today? 
Future 
involvement? 
DGD Full Yes Coordinator 
FPS ENV Full Yes Coordinator 
LNE Full Yes Coordinator 
Partnership for Water Full Yes Active contributer 
AWAC Full Yes Active contributer 
WBI Full Yes Active contributer 
IV Full Yes Active contributer 
FIT Full Yes Active contributer 
PMV Full No Invite to contribute 
FOD Fin – Finexpo Partial1 Yes Active contributer 
Nat Lottery Full Yes Active contributer 
Delcredere None Yes Willing to contribute 
BIO Incomplete Yes Willing to contribute 
BMI-SBI Full No Invite to contribute 
BI Full No Invite to contribute 
BIM Full No Invite to contribute 
FWO Full Yes Active contributer 
Legend: 
 → New actor  → Extra data  → No data 
 
1 Full data for interest bonifications, insufficient data for loans. 
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5 |  Results 
5.1 Results from raw screening of government budgets  
 
As suggested by DGD, we started our study by performing a rough screening of federal 
government budgets and expenses for the years 2013-2014 for the different government levels. 
For most governments (especially the Federal and Flemish governments), the data were readily 
available on their website. However, the data did not provide sufficient detail to further filter for 
climate finance flows on a project level, which was needed to correctly apply the Rio Marker 
methodology (see section 3.1). This is why we decided to contact the relevant departments and 
organizations directly, in order to receive the data on the climate flows. 
5.2 General results from the data-analysis 
 
In the next chapter, we will present the results of our study which is a quantitative overview of 
all the multilateral and bilateral climate finance of Belgian public actors.  We worked the following 
way: 
- We contacted organizations directly for their climate finance input 
- We conducted interviews with several important actors (mentioned under the previous 
chapter) 
- We created our own database based on the biennial reporting, ODA/OOF database from 
DGD, the Flemish online database and the new information we received. 
We distinguish between the reporting on the multilateral and bilateral climate finance data, 
because of its different nature and functionality. Additionally, funding from different government 
levels is often directed to the same multilateral fund (such as the Green Climate Fund), which 
makes the overview clearer. Furthermore, we separated grants and loans in the discussion on 
bilateral climate finance, because we do not consider it correct to treat them the same way, as 
we explained in the methodological chapter of this paper. 
5.3 Overview of multilateral climate finance 
 
The basis of this overview is the biennial reporting database we received from DGD. We received 
a small number of corrections on the 2013 and 2014 multilateral climate finance data from the 
Flemish and the Walloon regions, which we have included below. We have used the same colour 
coding as in the biennial data sheet we received, for reasons of clarity.   
All the Belgian public multilateral climate flows we identified were already reported in the 
biennial report. This is not surprising, as we can assume multilateral climate finance was already 
well documented. We describe the multilateral finance per actor, the recipient fund, the 
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distinction core and general finance versus climate-specific finance and the ODA-OOF label. In 
2013 and 2014, all the Belgian public multilateral climate flows were grants. In 2016, DGD used a 
capital contribution for the first time: € 10 million to the Green Climate Fund.   
5.3.1 Multilateral climate finance in 2013 
 
In table 2 we present the Belgian outgoing multilateral climate flows for 2013.  
Table 2. Multilateral climate finance in 2013 (€) 
actor Donor funding 
 Total amount  
 ODA/ OOF 
 Core/general   Climate-specific  
Multilateral climate change funds 
DGD 1. Global Environment Facility 17.000.000   ODA  
DGD 2. Least Developed Countries Fund  12.000.000  ODA  
DGD 3. Special Climate Change Fund  12.000.000  ODA  
DGD 4. Adaptation Fund  2.500.000 ODA 
WAL 4. Adaptation Fund  250.000 OOF 
BXL 4. Adaptation Fund  500.000 OOF 
 5. Green Climate Fund     
FLA 
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary 
Activities 
 27.571  ODA  
SPF 
7. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary 
Activities 
 67.908  ODA  
DGD 
 
8. Adaptation for Smallholders Agriculture 
Program (International Fund for Agricultural 
Development) 
 6.000.000  ODA  
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks 
DGD 1. World Bank 148.099.084   ODA  
DGD 2. International Finance Corporation     
DGD 3. African Development Bank 35.430.310   ODA  
DGD 4. Asian Development Bank 8.028.505   ODA  
DGD 
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
569.457   ODA  
DGD 6. Inter-American Development Bank 896.000   ODA  
DGD 7. Other      
DGD 7.1 European Investment Bank – EIB 9.805.031   ODA  
DGD 
7.2 European Development Fund 
(EOF/EDF/FED) 
104.146.474   ODA  
Specialized United Nations bodies:   
DGD 1. United Nations Development Programme 11.550.000   ODA  
FLA 
 
 
 
1.1 United Nations Development Programme: 
Strengthen capacity to incorporate climate 
change adaptation and resilience planning 
into National Biodiversity Strategies and 
Action Plans (NBSAPs) through the NBSAP 
Forum 
 115.000 ODA 
DGD 2. United Nations Environment Programme 4.550.000   ODA  
 3. Other:     
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DGD 3.1 Food and Agricultural Organization 4.250.752   ODA  
DGD 
3.2 International Fund for Agricultural 
Development 
8.000.000   ODA  
DGD 
3.2 World Food Programme - Immediate 
Response Account 
5.000.000   ODA  
FLA 
 
3.3 One UN Fund Malawi: National 
Programme for Managing Climate Change in 
Malawi 
 420.000 ODA 
FLA 
 
 
3.4 Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO): Contribution to an 
improved food security and nutritional status 
in Malawi, Phase II 
 163.310 ODA 
FLA 
 
 
3.6 United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Sustainable 
Management of Marginal Drylands 
(SUMAMAD-II) 
 1.062.824 ODA 
FLA 
 
 
3.7 United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Framework 
for Research, Education and Training in the 
Water Sector Phase III (FET -Water III) 
 212.243 ODA 
FLA 
3.8 International Labour Organisation (ILO): 
Decent Work in the Green Economy 
 450.000 ODA 
FLA 
 
 
3.10 World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF): 
Extending the Agroforestry Food Security 
Programme (AFSP) in Kasungu and Mzimba 
districts 
 160.000 ODA 
FLA 
 
3.12 The SEED initiative (UNEP, UNDP en 
IUCN): Promoting the Green Economy in 
Mozambique, Malawi and Namibia 
 294.690 ODA 
FLA 
 
3.13 The SEED initiative (UNEP, UNDP en 
IUCN): Supporting Social and Environmental 
Entrepreneurship in South Africa 
 
115.839 ODA 
FLA 
 3.14 International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA): African Clean Energy Corridor   
75.000 
 ODA  
FLA 3.15 Contribution to UNEP Resource panel  12.800 ODA 
FLA 
 
3.16 Southeast Pacific data and lnformation 
Networking support to integrated Coastal 
Area Management' (SPINCAM-II)  
57.484 ODA 
DGD 
Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research 7.400.000 
  ODA  
 
Total contributions through multilateral 
channels 
364.725.613 36.484.669    
 
In 2013, € 36.484.669 of climate-specific multilateral finance has been disbursed, and 
€ 364.725.613 as multilateral core finance. The bulk of the finance has been given in the form of 
ODA, only the following ones are counted as OOF: 
- € 250.000 contribution the Walloon Region to the Adaptation Fund 
- € 500.000 contribution of the Brussels Capital Region to the Adaptation Fund  
The Flemish Region and the federal government report all their public climate flows as ODA. 
 
The decision by the Walloon and the Brussels Capital Region governments to mark those 
payments as OOF is based on the objective to comply with the ‘new and additional’ objective (see 
paragraph 2.1).  
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5.3.2 Multilateral climate finance in 2014 
 
In table 3 we present the Belgian outgoing multilateral climate flows for 2014.  
 
Table 3. Multilateral climate finance in 2014 (€) 
actor Donor funding 
 Total amount  ODA/ 
OOF  Core/general   Climate-specific  
 Multilateral climate change funds          
DGD 1. Global Environment Facility 18.600.000  ODA 
DGD 2. Least Developed Countries Fund  12.000.000 ODA 
DGD 3. Special Climate Change Fund     
FLA 4. Adaptation Fund  1.000.000 ODA 
WAL 5. Green Climate Fund  250.000 OOF 
DGD 5. Green Climate Fund  40.000.000 ODA 
BXL 5. Green Climate Fund  600.000 OOF 
FLA 6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities  33.917 ODA 
SPF 7. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities  83.549 ODA 
 8. Other multilateral climate change funds     
SPF 8.1 International Partnership on Mitigation and MRV  22.040 ODA 
FLA 
8.2 IFAD: budget support for the  “Adaptation for 
Smallholder Agriculture Programme” 
 1.000.000 ODA 
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks:  
DGD 1. World Bank 148.747.082  ODA 
DGD 2. International Finance Corporation     
DGD 3. African Development Bank 33.987.573  ODA 
DGD 4. Asian Development Bank 7.933.541  ODA 
DGD 
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
    
DGD 6. Inter-American Development Bank     
DGD 7. Other     
DGD 7.1 European Investment Bank - EIB 4.146.560   ODA  
DGD 7.2 European Development Fund (EOF/EDF/FED) 111.017.344   ODA  
Specialized United Nations bodies:  
DGD 1. United Nations Development Programme 19.000.000  ODA 
FLA 
 
 
1.1 United Nations Development Programme: 
Strengthen capacity to incorporate climate change 
adaptation and resilience planning into National 
Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) 
through the NBSAP Forum 
 35.000 ODA 
DGD 2. United Nations Environment Programme 4.000.000  ODA 
 3. Other:     
DGD 3.1 Food and Agricultural Organization 5.426.366   ODA  
DGD 3.2 International Fund for Agricultural Development 8.000.000   ODA  
DGD 
3.2 World Food Programme - Immediate Response 
Account 
7.250.000   ODA  
FLA 
 
3.3 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO): Contribution to an improved food 
security and nutritional status in Malawi, Phase II 
 101.541 ODA 
FLA 
 
3.4 The SEED initiative (UNEP, UNDP en IUCN): 
Supporting Social and Environmental 
Entrepreneurship in South Africa (2014) 
 100.358 ODA 
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FLA 
 
3.5 UNESCO: Framework for Research, Education and 
Training in the Water Sector Phase III (FET -Water III) 
 105.002 ODA 
FLA 
 
3.6 UNESCO: Southeast Pacific data and lnformation 
Networking support to integrated Coastal Area 
Management' (SPINCAM-II) 
 82.940 ODA 
FLA 
 
 
3.7 UNESCO: Addressing Water Security: Climate 
impacts and adaptation responses in Africa, Asia and 
LAC 
 130.517 ODA 
FLA 
3.8 UNESCO: Climate Change Adaptation for African 
Natural World Heritage Sites 
 37.700 ODA 
FLA 
3.9 UNESCO: Enhancing Natural Hazards Resilience in 
South America (ENHANS) 
 188.500 ODA 
FLA 
 
3.10 UNESCO: Biosphere reserves as a tool for coastal 
and island management in the South-East Pacific 
region (BRESEP) 
 30.136 ODA 
FLA 3.11 UNESCO: Caribbean Marine Atlas, phase 2  38.219 ODA 
FLA 
 
3.12 UNESCO: Ecosystem-based marine spatial 
planning for conservation of World Heritage Marine 
Sites 
 25.220 ODA 
FLA 
 
3.13 ICRAF: support to the world congress on 
agroforestry 
 50.804 ODA 
FLA 
 
3.14 ICRAF: Extending the Agroforestry Food Security 
Programme (AFSP) in Kasungu and Mzimba districts 
 160.000 ODA 
FLA 
 
3.15 Southeast Pacific data and lnformation 
Networking support to integrated Coastal Area 
Management' (SPINCAM-II)   
33.176 ODA 
DGD 
 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research 8.000.000 
  ODA  
 Total contributions through multilateral channels 376.108.466 56.108.619   
 
In 2014, we see a relatively steady core contribution from Belgium, totalling € 376.108.466. The 
climate-specific multilateral finance has gone up from € 36.484.669 in 2013 to €56.108.619 in 
2014, which is to be explained by the one-off contribution  of € 40 million of the federal 
government to the Green Climate Fund in December 2014. Most of the contributions were made 
as ODA, but the following were labelled as OOF: 
- Walloon Region: € 250.000 to the Adaptation Fund 
- Brussels Capital Region: € 600.000 to the Green Climate Fund  
The decision by the Walloon and the Brussels Capital Region governments to mark those 
payments as OOF is based on the objective to comply with the ‘new and additional’ objective (see 
paragraph 2.1). This lead to the strange situation where the contributions to the Adaptatation 
Fund are marked as ODA by the Flemish Region, but as OOF by the Walloon and Brussels Regions.  
5.3.3 Attribution of multilateral finance  
 
In accordance to the methods developed by the multilateral development banks (MDBs), it is 
possible to calculate the climate relevant part of the core finance provided to these MDB’s. This 
can be done by using the amount of climate finance spent by the multilateral developments 
banks, and transposing it to the core contributions of Belgium. In using these equivalents, the 
result looks like this: 
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Table 4. Attribution of multilateral climate finance per fund (€, total for 2013 and 2014) 
 total % Attributed Belgian climate finance 
WB 296.846.166 23% 68.274.618 
AfDB 69.417.883 27% 18.742.828 
ADB 15.962.046 12% 1.915.446 
EBRD 569.457 36% 205.005 
IDB 896.000 17% 152.320 
EIB 13.951.590 23% 3.208.866 
Total 397.643.142  92.499.083 
Source: percentages taken from World Bank (2015) 
 
All in all, almost € 92 million of grant contributions (almost 53% of the core finance) to the World 
Bank (WB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IBD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) can be counted as climate-specific finance. It 
can be seen that a large difference exists between the different MDB’s and their climate 
portfolios: the EBRD spends 36% of its budget on climate projects, wereas the ADB only channels 
12% of its projects towards climate projects. For the other MDB’s and international organizations 
such coefficients are not available yet. 
5.4 Overview of bilateral finance per actor 
5.4.1 DGD 
  
As stated before, DGD gave us access to the database of the biennial reporting and the ODA 
database. We started with the biennial report as a basis, and cross-checked with the ODA 
database in order to make the calculations for both weighting methods. We have excluded the 
loans from their database, as we are concerned for overlap with the Finexpo data on state-to-
state loans and interest bonifications, because countries and projects match. Therefore, only 
grants are included in this picture. The section on Finexpo includes the loans. 
 
Data: 
- Retrieved from biennial report, checked with ODA database; 
- All flows are disbursed; 
- All flows are ODA; 
- All flows are grants. 
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Table 5. Overview of bilateral DGD climate finance per weighting method (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 33.850.620 52.176.854 
2014 33.571.542 56.171.278 
2013 -2014 67.422.162 108.348.132 
 
The table shows the remarkable difference between the two weighting methods. The DGD 
weighting method grants low weighting coefficients to most subsectors (often as low as 0 or 5) 
on average significantly less than the fixed 40% of the 0-40-100-method. The only exception is 
projects related to energy, which are value at 80 to 100%, so higher than the 40% of the 0-40-
100-method.  
5.4.2 FPS Environment 
 
Through our interview with FPS Environment and the data retrieved through the biennial 
reporting, we can see that only two projects were funded through FPS Environment, one on 
climate finance in Rwanda, the other on climate finance in Mozambique (both in 2014). This is 
not surprising, as FPS Environment does not have climate finance budget lines at the moment. 
Their contributions were counted as OOF. 
 
Data: 
- Retrieved from biennial report, checked with FPS; 
- All flows are disbursed; 
- All flows are OOF; 
- All flows are grants. 
 
 Table 6.  Overview of FPS Environment climate finance (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 0 0 
2014 6.194 12.388 
 
5.4.3 Finexpo 
 
Through the ministry of Finance, we received information on two categories of instruments from 
Finexpo: the interest bonifications (and adjacent grants), and the state-to state loans. All climate 
finance activities of Finexpo qualify as ODA. Because of potential overlap with the Biennial 
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reporting, we excluded the loans inserted by DGD in the biennial reporting, and used Finexpo 
data instead. However, the data we received from both DGD and Finexpo were not detailed 
enough to apply the grant equivalent methodology for loans.
6
 Therefore, we provide the data at 
face value, without inclusion of relevant negative flows. However, we still advise to use the grant 
equivalent method where possible. 
 
Data: 
- Received from FPS Finance; 
- All flows are disbursed; 
- All flows are ODA; 
- All flows are loans;  
- Interest bonifications: the amounts paid out as interest bonifications and adjacent grants; 
- State-to-state loans: state loans are at face value, because we lack detailed data on each 
loan to calculate the grant equivalent. 
 
Table 7.  Overview of Finexpo climate finance: Bonifications and grants (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 2.541.972 2.736.450 
2014 5.208.444 6.268.431 
Total 2013-2014 7.750.416 9.004.882 
Table 8.  Overview of Finexpo climate finance: state-to-state loans (€, face value) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 5.987.817 6.058.458 
2014 1.280.909 1.214.472 
Total 2013-2014 7.268.726 7.272.930 
 
It is important to see that the numbers in both tables, although quite similar at first sight, are very 
different. The figures in table 7 are comparable to the ones in the previous tables, but the figures 
in table 8 can not be compared with any other figures, because they are at face value. As a result, 
the € 7 million from table 8 has much lower value than the € 7 million from table 7. 
  
 
6  Next to the face value of the loan, we need information on the type of repayment, the interest rate, the maturity, 
the grace period, and the agreed discount rate 
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5.4.4 Walloon region  
 
The Walloon Region provided additional data for 2013-2014 through AWAC. A couple of flows 
were not yet reported through the Biennial reporting, so our study is the first occasion where the 
Walloon Region climate flows are reported in full. 
The regional government has given grants, but decided to report them as OOF in order to separate 
them from ODA and thus stress the additionality of the funds (Interviews).  
 
Data: 
- Retrieved from biennial report and supplemented with additional data from AWAC; 
- All flows are disbursed; 
- All flows are OOF; 
- All flows are grants. 
 
Table 9.  Overview of climate finance for the Walloon Region (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 339.685 324.075 
2014 79.709 94.309 
Total 2013-2014 419.394 418.384 
5.4.5 Wallonie-Bruxelles International (WBI) 
 
WBI provided full data on their project throught AWAC, with whom they collaborate. All flows 
are grants, and are already reported as ODA. 
 
Data: 
- Retrieved from biennial report and supplemented with additional data from WBI; 
- All flows are disbursed; 
- All flows are ODA; 
- All flows are grants. 
Table 10.  Overview of climate finance for Wallonie-Bruxelles International (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 523.103 789.006 
2014 392.354 674.393 
Total 2013-2014 915.458 1.463.399 
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5.4.6 BIO 
 
BIO provided partial data on their climate finance commitments, due to time constraints and 
difficulties in retrieving the data. BIO provided an aggregate number of total public climate 
finance which they estimate to have spent in the subsequent years. However, it is unclear which 
instruments are included in this number, and if and how they are weighted. This is why we 
decided not to include BIO in our further calculations on e.g. theme or region, and treated them 
separately. With some methodological support, we expect BIO will become able, and is already 
willing, to contribute to the Belgian climate finance reporting. 
Table 11.  Overview of BIO climate finance (mio €) 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2010-2014 
Total public climate 
finance 
20,60 10,70 34,20 25,30 8,20 99,00 
 
5.4.7 Flemish Region 
5.4.7.1 Bilateral climate finance from the Flemish Region – general picture 
 
The data on bilateral climate finance from Flanders are received from Internationaal Vlaanderen, 
who just finished their climate finance database during the course of our study. We filtered out 
the bilateral projects (all the bi-multi is counted under multilateral, as is the case in the biennial 
reporting), and used both weighting methods. It must be noted that the bulk of Flemish climate 
finance is reported through multi- or combined bi/multilateral channels, which explains the low 
figures for the bilateral climate finance. In total (including multilateral finance), Flanders has 
provided € 3.699.844 in 2013 and € 3.827.110 in 2014, according to their own 0-40-100 
methodology. This figures include the Flemish government-funded part of the projects of the 
Flemish Partnership Water for Development; the co-funded part of those projects are reported 
in the next section (table 13). 
 
Data: 
- Retrieved from the Flemish database; 
- All flows are disbursed; 
- All flows are ODA; 
- All flows are grants. 
- Flows from the Flemish Partnership Water for Development are included. 
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Table 12.  Overview of bilateral climate finance from the Flemish Region (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 370.560 406.878 
2014 288.855 414.584 
Total 2013-2014 659.415 821.461 
 
 
5.4.7.2 Flemish Partnership Water for Development 
 
The projects from the Flemish Partnership Water for Development are co-financed. The part that 
is subsidised by the Flemish government is already included in the figures for the Flemish 
government (see table 12). A small part of the funds is contributed by Flemish drinking water 
companies and other public companies, and it is that contribution that is reported in this 
paragraph.  
Through the Flemish Partnership for Water, co-financing has been provided by water companies 
and other service companies, being de Watergroep, Havenbedrijf Antwerpen, TMVW and Pidpa. 
As expected, the additional amounts retrieved are not very high, and can serve as an example for 
similar co-financing projects, where the co-financing part is often unknown but could count as 
climate finance. Specific details can be consulted in the climate finance database, but the general 
numbers are given below. 
 
Data: 
- New, via LNE; 
- All flows are disbursed;  
- All flows are ODA; 
- All flows are grants.  
Table 13.  Flemish Partnership Water for Development climate finance, part provided by public co-
funders (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 16.448 21.931 
2014 25.378 33.837 
Total 2013-2014 41.826 55.768 
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5.4.8 National Lottery 
 
The National Lottery has contributed data of their project subsidy call on the Millennium 
Development Goals, in which climate relevant projects were supported by grants. The data are 
given on a commitment level, as disbursement level data are not available. The committed 
amounts are reserved for two years, in this timeframe the receiving organisation has to use the 
funds and account for the expenses. These funds are new funds, not yet included in the current 
climate finance reporting.  
 
Data: 
- New, retrieved from the National Lottery; 
- All flows are on commitment level; 
- All flows are ODA; 
- All flows are grants.  
Table 14.  Overview of the National Lottery climate finance (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 35.449 46.578 
2014 98.340 109.040 
Total 2013-2014 133.789 155.618 
 
5.4.9 FIT 
 
FIT has provided new data on possible climate relevant numbers on their line on export subsidy 
for machinery and the subsidy line for prospection studies. We filtered out the climate relevant 
projects, which all have a Rio Marker 1. Surprisingly, the DGD method values the projects higher 
than the 0-40-100 method. This is due to the large amount of energy projects supported, which 
are valuated over 40% in the DGD method. The amounts are given on disbursement level, and 
count as OOF, as these grants do not have a development goal in mind. 
 
Data: 
- New, retrieved from FIT; 
- All flows are disbursed;  
- All flows are OOF; 
- All flows are grants. 
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Table 15.  Overview of FIT climate finance (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 285.871 190.256 
2014 848.224 780.994 
Total 2013-2014 1.134.096 971.250 
 
5.4.10 FWO 
 
FWO has provided data on their international research call, meaning only projects located in 
developing countries are funded. Using discipline codes and search terms we provided, they 
filtered out the climate-relevant projects. It must be noted that the core target for FWO is not 
development but academic excellence, therefore we count the projects as OOF. All contributions 
are made on a commitment level (data on disbursement level are not available), and are given as 
grants.  
 
Data: 
- New, retrieved from FWO; 
- All flows are on the commitment level (for 3-4 years, depending on the project); 
- All flows are OOF; 
- All flows are grants. 
 
Table 16.  Overview of FWO climate finance (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 1.744.410 2.419.059 
2014 1.302.992 1.417.112 
2013-2014 3.047.402 3.836.171 
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5.4.11 Overview of all bilateral grants per actor 
Table 17.  Overview of all bilateral grants per actor (€, 2013 + 2014) 
Actor DGD method 0-40-100 method 
DGD 67.422.162 108.348.132 
Flemish Region 659.415 821.461 
SPF Environment 6.194 12.388 
Walloon Region 419.394 418.384 
WBI 915.458 1.463.399 
Finexpo1 7.750.416 9.004.882 
National Lottery 133.789 155.618 
FWO 3.047.402 3.836.178 
Partnership water 41.826 55.768 
FIT 1.134.096 971.250 
Total 81.530.150 125.087.460 
1 including bonifications and grants, excluding loans (see 5.4.3) 
 
This table gives an overview of the bilateral grants per actor. The flows that were not included in 
previous official climate finance reporting are given in grey. It is clear that DGD is the dominant 
actor in Belgian official climate finance with 83% of the total climate flows7. Second come FWO 
and FIT, followed by Flanders. The relatively low number for Flanders can be explained by the 
higher multilateral contributions.  
The distribution of the flows per actor is shown in figure 5. 
 
 
7  Or 87% with the 0-40-100-method. Note that this percentage will be lower in reality, as the figures of 
BIO and Delcredere are not included and the Finexpo data only partially. 
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Figure 5.  Distribution of climate flows per actor (DGD weighting method, excluding Delcredere and 
BIO and with only partial data for Finexpo) 
5.5 ODA vs. OOF 
 
As expected, the bulk of the Belgian bilateral climate flows in our database are ODA: 94% is ODA, 
6% is OOF. This picture may change when BIO and Delcredere figures are added in future 
reporting, as those actors relatively may have more OOF. 
 
Table 18. Bilateral climate finance, ODA vs. OOF (€)   
  
DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 ODA 37.235.410 56.177.696 
 OOF 2.369.966 2.933.390 
2014 ODA 39.618.913 63.671.563 
 
OOF 2.237.120 2.304.803 
total 2013-2014 ODA 76.854.323 119.849.260 
 
OOF 4.607.086 5.238.193 
 
  
DGD
Flanders
SPF Environment
AWAC
WBI
Finexpo
Nationale Loterij
FWO
Partnership water
FIT
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5.6 Overview of bilateral finance per instrument 
5.6.1 Grants 
 
The most used instruments for Belgian climate finance in 2013-2014 are grants, totalling more 
than €81 million if counted by the DGD method, and more than € 125 million if counted by the 0-
40-100 method. As we will see later, the large difference can be explained by the inclusion of 
many programmes that are included in the DGD database (such as general programme finance 
for a budget line of an NGO), but which are only weighted as 0 or 5% climate relevance using the 
DGD weighting method, whereas the 0-40-100 method will automatically count these numbers 
at 40%. The overall difference between 2013 and 2014 is small, thus showing a steady amount of 
bilateral grants being provided each year. 
  
We cannot calculate an exact ratio of the amount (in euro) of grants compared to loans, since we 
lack the data for calculating the grant equivalent of the BIO and Finexpo loans. But judging on the 
number of entries in our database that have the grant or loan lable, it is clear that the loans are 
very small compared to the grants. This is not surprising considering the history of Belgian climate 
finance and its domination by development institutions responsible for the funding. Moreover, 
the Belgian climate finance actors have less institutional capacity compaired with bigger 
countries, whose higher capacity allows for more experimentation with other instruments. 
Finally, the actors who use other instruments, such as equity, guarantees or non-concessional 
loans could not provide sufficient data to be included in this study, thereby laying the focus on 
grant contributions. 
Table 19.  Overview of grants per year per method (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 39.708.118 59.111.087 
2014 41.822.032 65.976.366 
Total 2013-2014 81.530.150 125.087.460 
5.6.2 Loans 
 
The only loans for which we have obtained data come from Finexpo, and can be consulted under 
paragraph 5.4.3. We only have face value data, so these cannot be compared to any other tables, 
nor can they be added to other figures we have found.  
For loans, the difference between the DGD method and the 0-40-100 method is almost zero, 
which is a big difference with the result we found for the case of the grants. This can be explained 
by the presence of a number of energy projects in the loans, which in the DGD method have a 
higher coefficient than the 40% used in the 0-40-100 method.  
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The number of loans is, even if the numbers are not exactly comparable because of the lack of 
the grant equivalent, much smaller than the number of grants. This can be explained by the lack 
of detailed data from BIO, who have loans in their portfolio, but also by a preference of most 
actors for using grants. 
Table 20.  Overview of loans per year per weighting method (€) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 5.987.817 6.058.458 
2014 1.280.909 1.214.472 
Total 2013-2014 7.268.726 7.272.930 
5.7   Finance for mitigation or adaptation 
  
The projects or activities behind climate finance can be relevant for climate mitigation, adaptation 
or be ‘cross-cutting’, which means that they have both beneficial impacts.  
In this overview, we distinguish between grants and loans. 
5.7.1 Grants 
 
Table 21 shows the mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting shares of the grants.  
Table 21. Overview grants per theme (€) 
  DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 mitigation             13.629.446                 13.599.831  
 adaptation             18.523.518                 30.279.109  
 cross-cutting               7.112.728                 14.908.072  
2014 mitigation               9.211.542                 11.278.490  
 adaptation             21.617.325                 33.951.651  
 cross-cutting             10.947.457                 20.651.915  
total 2013-2014 mitigation             22.840.988                 24.878.321  
 adaptation             40.140.842                 64.230.761  
 cross-cutting             18.060.185                 35.559.987  
 
This overview per theme reveals that most Belgian bilateral grants are directed towards 
adaptation projects, as is also shown in figure 6. Cross-cutting activities and mitigation receive 
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less attention, but remain significant. The difference stands out especially with the 0-40-100 
method. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Financing for adaptation or mitigation, grants, DGD method, total for 2013 + 2014 
 
The dominance of adaptation projects in the Belgian climate finance is in line with the political 
priorities of the federal development policy. However, it is rather different from the rest of the 
world, where mitigation projects have always attracted more investments. An illustration for this 
claim is the fact that from all the climate flows that were invested in 2014 by all MDB’s together, 
82% went to mitigation projects and only 18% to adaptation (World Bank 2015).  
5.7.2 Loans 
 
With regard to the loans provided by Finexpo, the picture is different. The amount for mitigation 
is much higher than for adaptation. However, the difference is statistically irrelevant, because the 
data only cover six loans.  We also emphasize that the figures for loans are not grant equivalent 
but face value. As a result, the numbers in this table are not comparable to any other tables. 
mitigation
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Table 22.  Overview loans per theme (€) 
  DGD method 0-40-100 method 
2013 mitigation 5.447.539 5.403.575 
 adaptation 540.278 654.883 
 cross-cutting - - 
2014 mitigation 1.233.135 1.156.563 
 adaptation 47.774 57.908 
 cross-cutting - - 
total 2013-2014 mitigation 6.680.674 6.560.139 
 adaptation 588.053 712.791 
 cross-cutting 
- - 
5.8 Overview per region 
5.8.1 Grants 
 
 
Figure 7.  Grants per region, DGD method, total for 2013 + 3014 
 
In both methods, the overall majority of the funds are directed to Africa, totalling +- 60% of all 
funds. Second comes Asia, before Latin-Amerika. Universal or unknown projects count for € 8.7 
million according to the DGD method, and for € 16 million according to the 0-40-100 method. The 
difference here can, as stated before, be explained because of the inclusion of NGO programme 
funding in the DGD database, which only counts for 5% using the DGD method, compared to 40% 
under the 0- 40-100 method. 
Latin-
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Table 23.  Overview grants per region (€, total for 2013 + 2014) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
Africa 49.960.377 74.987.026 
Asia 13.160.752 18.806.678 
Latin-America 9.630.592 15.238.533 
Universal/Unknown 8.709.689 16.030.530 
Europe - 24.686 
 
5.8.2 Loans 
Table 24.  Overviews loans per region (€, total for 2013 + 2014) 
 DGD method 0-40-100 method 
Africa 6.680.674 6.560.139 
Asia 588.053 712.791 
Latin-America - - 
Universal/Unknown - - 
Europe - - 
5.9 Outlook: data 2015 and beyond 
 
In our efforts to collect data on Belgian climate finance in 2013-2014, we have come across data 
for 2015 and 2016 and even some projections for the future: 
- Flemish Region: the Flemish database includes figures for 2015 and provides data on the 
planned expenses in the next years. These numbers can give a first indication of the 
climate flows in the future, but are likely to be incomplete. In 2015, the donations of 
Flanders go up significantly, mainly due to a € 3.5 million donation made to the Green 
Climate Fund. However, if Flanders wants to reach the € 14,5 million in climate finance 
agreed in the intra-Belgian climate agreement, additional (urgent) efforts are needed. 
- DGD: DGD will remain a very important stakeholder in public climate finance in Belgium. 
In 2016, € 10 million was disbursed as a capital contribution to the Green Climate Fund. 
- Walloon Region: in our interview with a representative from AWAC, we have received 
preliminary expenses from the Walloon region. However, we have not been able to 
confirm them afterwards, therefore caution is necessary. In general, the Walloon region 
will start disbursing € 7 million per year for international climate finance from 2016 
onwards, which is close to the required total of € 8,25 million agreed in the burden sharing 
agreement. The following numbers were given: 
 2016: € 1 million to the Adaptation Fund, € 7 million to the Green Climate fund and 
€ 1 million for a projects call (to be specified) 
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 2017: 7 million for international climate funds (to be specified) 
If the disbursements from the regions go up in the coming years as projected, they will become 
more important actors in the climate finance field than they are today. 
Additionally, Belgian municipalities and cities could become relevant climate actors. We 
contacted VVSG and its Walloon counterpart UVCW, but no new additional information was 
revealed. However, in the future, relevant climate finance flows from these actors can be 
expected.  
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6 |  Discussion and recommendations 
In this paper, we have made a comprehensive overview of Belgian climate finance in 2013-2014. 
After describing the numbers in the previous chapter, we will now shortly discuss the main 
observations of our tracking effort. 
 
With regard to the climate finance results, the following elements stand out
8
: 
- We have discovered several new flows that have never been identified as climate flows 
in any reporting efforts up to now, from the following organizations: 
 FWO: € 3 million under the DGD method, € 3,8 million under the 0-40-100 
method 
 FIT: € 1,1 million under the DGD method, € 1 million under the 0-40-100 
method 
 Partnership for Water: € 41.826 under the DGD method, € 55.768 under the 0-
40-100 method 
 National Lottery: € 133.789 under the DGD method, € 155.618 under the 0-40-
100 method 
- The overall climate finance picture for 2013-2014 is dominated by DGD, especially when 
we look at bilateral grants. After the signature of the intra-Belgian burden sharing 
agreement of December 2015, we expect to see an increase of the flows provided by the 
regions in the future. Another expected change for the future is that the figures for BIO 
and Delcredere will probably be added to the next reporting exercise, as well as the 
information for the Finexpo loans. With those additions, the Belgian public climate 
finance picture will be complete.  
- The majority of bilateral climate finance is oriented towards Africa. Asia and Latin-
America also receive climate finance flows, but to a much lesser degree. 
- The majority of Belgian climate finance is ODA, whereas OOF is only reported from a 
limited amount of actors. Here, there is a difference between the actors who report on 
OOF because of different interpretations of climate finance additionality, and actors who 
report on OOF because their flows do not meet the ODA conditions. 
- More Belgian bilateral grants are spent on adaptation than on mitigation and cross-
cutting activities. However, for loans, the situation the opposite: here, most loans go to 
mitigation projects.  
 
 
8 The figures in this list are totals for 2013 + 2014 
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With regard to the methodology, the following points stand out: 
- The Rio Marker methodology proves to be very helpful in defining which projects are 
climate-relevant and which are not. The manual is clear and user-friendly, which makes it 
relatively easy to give the correct marker to each project. However, the method also has 
its limitations, especially in deciding the difference between a ‘0’ and a ‘1’: here, a strict 
application of the Rio Marker methodology would probably lead to less projects being 
selected. We suspect (on the basis of titles), that many projects currently marked with a 
‘1’ in the database only have a limited climate component. 
- Using the DGD method and the 0-40-100 method, we discovered that the 0-40-100 
method usually leads to higher reported climate finance flows, as the description per 
actor clearly shows. However, we suspect this difference is partially due to the different 
attribution of the Rio Markers. DGD includes several programme funding for NGOs, but 
only weights them at 5%. Under the 0-40-100 method, these projects are automatically 
weighted at 40%, which explains the big difference. The DGD method may have a higher 
validity for the projects with Rio Marker ‘1’, while the 0-40-100 method has the benefit 
of international comparability, although the 0-40-100 method is not applied by every 
country. 
- The discussion between ODA and OOF is clouded by the different interpretations of the 
definition of OOF in Belgium. The Brussels Capital Region, the Walloon Region and WBI 
prefer to treat climate funds separately because of the additionality requirement for 
climate funds. However, other funding, such as from FIT or FWO also counts as OOF, 
because it has no explicit development focus.  
- The calculation of a grant equivalent for loans was impossible because of limited data 
availability. In order to use the methods described by the OECD in calculating the grant 
equivalent, more elaborate information is needed for each loan. Now, we only could 
report on the outgoing disbursements made in each year for each loan (face value). This 
is why we have separated the loans from the grants in our study, in order to avoid 
weighting loans and grants equally. 
 
With regard to the process, we raise the following points: 
- Many actors we contacted are willing to provide climate finance data, but are unaware of 
the Rio Marker method, and are unable to put it into practice. Additionally, several actors 
report a large administrative burden in retrieving the relevant data from their databases. 
- Although the climate flows of a few official Belgian actors are not included in our report, 
we believe our study made a significant contribution to today’s and future climate finance 
reporting. All actors have at least been asked the question about their climate flows; 
internal approval procedures have been launched, internal efforts were made to retrieve 
the date from the organisation’s own databases and towards the final phase of our study, 
DGD and FPS Environment founded a new working group with all federal actors working 
on the issue of climate finance. Our study can be considered as one of the factors that 
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convinced the Belgian stakeholders that they are part of the climate finance study, and 
they now realise they will need to find a way to report their climate flows in the near 
future.  
 
After conducting the study, the following recommendations stand out, not only for DGD as the 
commissioner of our study, but aimed at all climate finance actors in Belgium. 
- Our recommendation to create a Belgian working group on climate finance to develop 
a common reporting framework has been put into practice even before our study was 
finalized. Two initiatives have recently arisen
9
: 
 A follow-up study within the framework of Befind has been defined, which aims 
at surveying the exact needs of all the public climate finance stakeholders for 
their future reporting. A workshop will be organised, and individual guidance for 
different organisations will be provided.  
 DGD and FPS Environment founded a new informal working group with 
government actors working on the issue of climate finance. In the first phase, 
only the federal actors take part in this informal working group, but in a next 
phase it intends to invite all relevant Belgian public actors.  
The follow-up committees of the Trinomics and Befind studies from 2015 and 2016 can 
be considered as partial first steps towards this working group. Knowledge sharing on 
climate finance reporting will be central in all these new initiatives. The working group(s) 
may also co-ordinate a stronger follow-up of the international discussions on the climate 
finance reporting initiatives, e.g. on the OECD level, and more feedback from that 
international level towards the Belgian actors.  
- Translate the national climate finance burden sharing agreement in an operational 
programme.  This programme should have a time-frame of at least three years, and would 
include a vision and concrete action on how each different government level plans to 
reach the amounts in the agreement. The role of all the concerned government actors in 
this effort will need to be determined. The regional governments will need to speed-up 
their current contributions considerably in order to reach the agreed targets.  
- Inform relevant actors on the use of the Rio Markers: In order to track climate finance, 
it is useful to increase the stakeholders’ capability to use the Rio Markers. A training 
exercise could be helpful. 
- Decide on which weighting option to choose. For this study, we used the two common 
used climate finance weighing methods used in Belgium. Although this turned out to be 
a feasible exercise, having two methodologies obviously makes matters more complex, 
and increases the distance between different actors.  
- During our study, we advised the competent actors to provide transparency on the 
weighting options used. This recommendation is already implemented: the Flemish 
region has recently proceeded in explaining the 0-40-100 method on their website, and 
 
9  And a third one, an ad-hoc working group on climate finance reporting under the umbrella of the CCIEP, has been 
in place for a longer time. 
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DGD now provides transparency by agreeing to include their list of weighting coefficients 
in the annex of this research paper (annex 1). 
- With regard to the international climate finance negotiations and the discussions in the 
OECD-context on climate finance and accounting measures, we advise all Belgian actors 
to follow the discussions closely and adapt the climate finance tracking process 
accordingly. This would be especially needed in order to achieve internationally 
comparable climate finance results.  
- Develop a system to integrate co-financing of a project in climate finance reporting. As 
our results from the Flemish Partnership for Water show, projects are sometimes co-
financed, not only by private but also by public actors. If the data is readily available, it 
would be advisable to record them directly, as it will provide for a more complete climate 
finance figure.  
- A recommendation that is directed directly to the different stakeholders, is to reform 
their internal procedures for gathering data and reporting. Every actor has its own 
database, but the new issue of climate relevance, Rio Markers and weighting are in some 
cases not part of the regular data gathering and reporting practices. In some cases, the 
number of climate flows is limited, which should make the reporting an easy exercise. 
However, as the climate finance parameters are not into their databases at the moment, 
it becomes a hell of a job to filter out the relevant flows from the general database. 
Integrating the climate finance parameters in the internal data gathering systems could 
solve this issue for good. The follow-up projects that will be carried out by the Befind 
researchers and the recent networking initiatives that have arisen may help the 
organisations to make those reforms to their internal systems.  
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Annex 1: Weighting method DGD  
Table 25. DGD’s weighting method - weighting coefficients 
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 Sector onbepaald 0 34 14 14 
Administratieve kosten van BUDGETHOUDERS 0 0 0 0 
Bosbouw - Bosbouwbeleid en administratief 
beheer 
0 33 33 33 
Bosbouw - Bosbouwonderzoek 0 33 33 33 
Bosbouw - Bosbouwontwikkeling 33 0 33 33 
Bosbouw - Opleiding en vorming 0 33 33 33 
Conflict, Vrede, Veiligheid - Conflictpreventie, -
resolutie en Vredesopbouw 
0 20 15 15 
Energie - Biomassa 80 0 0 0 
Energie - Energiebeleid en administratief beheer 0 20 0 20 
Energie - Energieproductie van hernieuwbare 
bronnen 
100 0 0 0 
Energie - Hydro-elektrische centrales en 
stuwdammen 
80 0 0 0 
Energie - Transmissie en verdeling van elektriciteit 50 0 0 0 
Energie - Windenergie 100 0 0 0 
Energie - Zonne-energie 100 0 0 0 
Financiën/Banken - Microkrediet 0 0 0 0 
Gezondheid - Basisgezondheid - 
Basisgezondheidszorg 
0 20 20 20 
Gezondheid - Basisgezondheid - Basisvoeding 0 20 20 20 
Gezondheid - Basisgezondheid - Besmettelijke 
ziekten 
0 20 20 20 
Gezondheid - Basisgezondheid - Educatie 
basisgezondheid 
0 20 20 20 
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Gezondheid - Basisgezondheid - Infrastructuur 
basisgezondheid 
0 20 20 20 
Gezondheid - Gezondheidsbeleid en -adm. beheer 0 20 20 20 
Gezondheid - Medisch onderwijs en vorming 0 20 20 20 
Gezondheid - Medisch onderzoek 0 20 20 20 
Gezondheid - Medische diensten en centra 0 20 20 20 
Handel - Technische handelsbelemmeringen 5 5 5 5 
Humanitaire hulp - Noodhulp - andere dan 
voedselhulp 
0 10 5 5 
Humanitaire hulp - Noodhulp - Coördinatie van 
noodhulp. Bescherming en ondersteunende 
diensten 
0 5 5 5 
Humanitaire hulp - Noodhulp - Noodvoedselhulp 0 10 0 0 
Humanitaire hulp - Preventie van en 
voorbereiding op rampen 
0 30 0 10 
Humanitaire hulp - Reconstructie en rehabilitatie 0 30 0 0 
Industrie - Agro-industrie 10 0 0 0 
Industrie - Ontwikkeling van KMO's 0 0 0 0 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Alternatieve 
landbouwteelten (tegen drugteelt) 
0 10 15 10 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Bescherming van 
gewassen en oogst, strijd tegen plagen 
0 10 2 10 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Diergeneeskundige 
diensten 
5 0 2 2 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Exportgewassen en 
industriële landbouwteelt 
0 0 0 0 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Landbouwbeleid en 
administratief beheer 
0 20 20 20 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Landbouwcoöperatieven 0 5 5 0 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Landbouwdiensten 0 20 20 20 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Landbouwgronden 0 33 33 33 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Landbouwhervormingen 0 5 5 5 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Landbouwkrediet 0 0 0 0 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Landbouwontwikkeling 5 0 5 5 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Landbouwproductie voor 
voeding 
5 0 5 5 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Landbouwvoorlichting 0 20 20 20 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Onderzoek 0 20 20 20 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Opleiding en vorming 0 20 20 20 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Producten voor 
landbouwgebruik 
0 10 2 10 
Landbouw en veeteelt - Veeteelt 5 0 2 5 
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Landbouw en veeteelt - Waterhulpmiddelen voor 
landbouwgebruik 
40 0 0 40 
Milieubescherming - Beleid en administratief 
beheer 
0 33 33 33 
Milieubescherming - Bescherming van de biosfeer 80 0 10 10 
Milieubescherming - Bescherming van 
landschapsmonumenten 
0 20 40 40 
Milieubescherming - Biodiversiteit 20 0 60 20 
Milieubescherming - Onderzoek i.v.m. het 
leefmilieu 
0 33 33 33 
Milieubescherming - Opvoeding en vorming i.v.m. 
het leefmilieu 
0 33 33 33 
Milieubescherming - Preventie en strijd tegen 
overstromingen 
0 80 10 10 
Multisector - Multisector opleiding en vorming 0 10 10 10 
Multisector - Rurale ontwikkeling 15 0 15 15 
Multisector - Stedelijke ontwikkeling en 
stadsbeheer 
0 10 10 10 
Multisector - Wetenschappelijke en 
onderzoeksinstellingen 
0 10 10 10 
Multisector algemeen 0 5 5 5 
NGO - Algemene steun voor Belgische NGO (van 
donorland) 
0 0 0 0 
Ondernemingen - Diensten voor Commerciële 
doeleinden 
0 0 0 0 
Onderwijs - Beroepsvorming 0 0 0 0 
Onderwijs - Hoger onderwijs 0 15 15 15 
Onderwijs - Onderwijsbeleid en administratief 
beheer 
0 5 5 5 
Onderwijs - Uitrusting en vorming 10 10 10 10 
Onderwijs - Vorming onderwijzend personeel 0 5 5 5 
Overheid & Civiele Maatschappij  - Decentralisatie 
en steun aan subnationale overheden 
5 5 5 5 
Overheid & Civiele Maatschappij -  Democratische 
participatie en inspraak van de burgers 
5 5 5 5 
Overheid & Civiele Maatschappij - Anticorruptie 
organisaties en instellingen 
5 5 5 5 
Overheid & Civiele Maatschappij - Beheer van de 
openbare financiën 
5 5 5 5 
Overheid & Civiele Maatschappij - 
Mensenrechten 
0 0 0 0 
Overheid & Civiele Maatschappij - Organisaties en 
instellingen voor gendergelijkheid 
5 5 5 5 
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Overheid & Civiele Maatschappij - Publieke 
sector: beleid en management 
5 5 5 5 
Overheid & Civiele Maatschappij - Studiefonds of 
expertisefonds 
5 5 5 5 
Schuldverlichting - Algemeen 0 0 0 0 
Sensibilisering van het Belgische publiek over hulp 10 10 10 10 
Sociale infrastructuur - Plurisectorale hulp voor 
elementaire sociale diensten 
0 0 0 0 
Sociale infrastructuur - Sociale diensten 0 0 0 0 
Sociale infrastructuur - Werkgelegenheidsbeleid 
en administratief beheer 
10 10 10 10 
Toerisme - Beleid en administratief beheer 5 5 5 5 
Transport en opslag - Spoorvervoer 0 0 0 0 
Transport en opslag - Watervervoer 0 30 20 0 
Transport en opslag - Wegvervoer 0 0 0 0 
Visvangst en aquacultuur - Opleiding en vorming 0 20 20 20 
Visvangst en aquacultuur - Visvangstbeleid en 
administratief beheer 
0 20 20 0 
Visvangst en aquacultuur - Visvangstonderzoek 0 20 20 0 
Visvangst en aquacultuur - Visvangstontwikkeling 0 0 5 0 
Watervoorziening en -sanering - Afvalverwerking 25 0 25 25 
Watervoorziening en -sanering - Beleid voor 
watervoorziening en administratief beheer 
0 25 25 25 
Watervoorziening en -sanering - Bescherming 
watervoorraden 
0 33 33 33 
Watervoorziening en -sanering - Grootschalig 0 30 0 0 
Watervoorziening en -sanering - Kleinschalig 0 30 10 10 
Watervoorziening en -sanering - Opleiding 
waterverdeling en sanering 
0 20 20 20 
Watervoorziening en -sanering - Rivieren 0 33 33 33 
Watervoorziening en -sanering - Sanering 
grootschalig 
30 0 0 0 
Watervoorziening en -sanering - Sanering 
kleinschalig 
0 30 10 10 
Watervoorziening en -sanering - 
Watervoorziening grootschalig 
0 30 0 0 
Watervoorziening en -sanering - 
Watervoorziening kleinschalig 
0 30 10 10 
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Annex 2: List of OECD DAC recipients 
 
Figure 8. List of OECD-DAC countries 
